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Abstract
Futureprocessors are expectedto observeincreasingrates of
hardware faults. Using Dual-Modular Redundancy (DMR),
two cores of a multicore can be loosely coupled to redun-
dantly execute a single software thread, providing very high
coverage from many difference sources of faults. This relia-
bility, however, comes at a high price in terms of per-thread
IPC and overall system throughput.
We makethe observationthat a user may want to runboth
applications requiring high reliability, such as ﬁnancial soft-
ware,andmorefaulttolerantapplicationsrequiringhighper-
formance, such as media or web software, on the same ma-
chine at the same time. Yet a traditional DMR system must
fully operate in redundant mode whenever any application
requires high reliability.
This paper proposes a Mixed-Mode Multicore (MMM),
which enables most applications, including the system soft-
ware, to run with high reliability in DMR mode, while ap-
plications that need high performance can avoid the penalty
of DMR. Though conceptually simple, two key challenges
arise: 1) care must be taken to protect reliable applications
from any faults occurring to applications running in high
performance mode, and 2) the desire to execute additional
independent software threads for a performance application
complicates the scheduling of computation to cores. After
solving these issues, an MMM is shown to improve overall
system performance, compared to a traditional DMR sys-
tem, by approximately2X when one reliable and one perfor-
mance application are concurrently executing.
Categories and Subject Descriptors B.8.2 [Performance
and Reliability]: Performance Analysis and Design Aids
General Terms Reliability, Design, Performance
Keywords Multicore, Dual-Modular Redundancy
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1. Introduction
As technology scales, the components of future multicore
processors become less reliable because smaller transistors
and wires are more susceptible to hardware faults. These
faults are caused by a variety of factors including high-
energy particle strikes, manufacturing process variation, de-
vice wear-out, and are affected by temperature and voltage
ﬂuctuations [5, 6,8, 10,22, 24]. Hardware faults can cause
transient, intermittent, or permanent computational errors,
which then manifest within software in a multitude of ways
[15,35].
Many circuit and microarchitecturaltechniquescan toler-
ate hardware faults to a degree, while preserving the view of
continuous, reliable hardware operation that system and ap-
plication software have come to expect. Unfortunately these
techniques tend to either have low overhead, but only mod-
est fault coverage (e.g., [7,25,30]), or excellent fault cov-
erage, but high overhead (e.g., [12,14,19,29]). One tech-
nique in particular,Dual-ModularRedundancy(DMR), falls
into the latter category: It can provide very high coverage
from many different sources of faults, at nearly a 4X reduc-
tion in throughput in some cases. Nonetheless, certain ap-
plications and users already desire high reliability and the
peace of mind that comes with the use of DMR — and are
willing to pay extra in terms of performance and machine
cost [1,4,18,26].
Due to the degree with which chip manufacturers guard
any information concerning hardware failures, it is difﬁ-
cult to ascertain the fault rates of current, let alone future,
chips. But if reliability trends continue for the next decade
or longer, multicore processors without DMR will become
less and less reliable, and therefore useful for a smaller frac-
tion of applications. Eventually, manufacturing experts may
choose to push technology to a point where nearly all soft-
ware needs to run with DMR. In the meantime, however, we
expect many applications (or portions of many applications)
toremainsufﬁcientlyreliablewhileusingonlylow-overhead
techniques, leading a user to run multiple applications with
differing reliability requirements at the same time.
For example, a desktop user may wish to run both a me-
diaapplicationandapersonalﬁnanceapplicationatthesame
time. Media applications tend to be insensitive to moderateFigure 1. Mixed-Mode with a Single-OS
levels of hardware faults [23], but a user may be willing to
sacriﬁce a certain degree of performance to ensure the in-
tegrity of their ﬁnancial data. Another example is a consoli-
dated server hosting multiple guest virtual machines (VMs)
for multiple customers with different service-level agree-
ments. Some customers may require very high reliability (at
a premium price). Other customers may demand more per-
formance at an economy price, but are willing to tolerate
occasional data corruption and down-time due to crashes.
Such scenarios result in a system where one set of ap-
plications, the reliable applications, need the protection of
DMR, while another set, the performance applications, need
the high performance available through independent utiliza-
tion of all of the computing resources. To enable such a sys-
tem, this paper proposes the design of a Mixed-Mode Multi-
core (MMM) that can execute both types of applications si-
multaneously on the same machine. The basics of an MMM
seem simple: Use DMR for reliable applications, and turn
off DMR for performance applications.
Although several architectural DMR proposals suggest
that DMR can easily be turned on and off (e.g., [19,32]),
a key observation of this paper is that dynamically switch-
ing between DMR and non-DMR within a single system is
not as straightforward as it might appear. In particular, we
observe that 1) care must be taken to preserve the integrity
of reliable applications’ memory and register state, and 2)
thedesiretoexecuteadditionalindependentsoftwarethreads
for a performance application complicates the scheduling of
software threads to cores. As part of the solution to the ﬁrst
problem, we propose to maintain a small amount of redun-
dancy for non-DMR applications by re-validating permis-
sion for any stores that miss in the L1 cache. To address
the second problem, we propose to leverage hardware vir-
tualization techniques to ﬂexibly and quickly assign threads
to cores. The resulting MMM system is able to protect the
integrityof reliable applications needingDMR, signiﬁcantly
improveoverall performanceof applicationsthat do not, and
preserve a simple interface to the system software (i.e., op-
erating system or virtual machine monitor).
2. Mixed-Mode Overview
The primary objective of an MMM is simple: provide re-
liability for software that requires it, and improve the per-
Figure 2. Mixed-Mode Consolidated Server
formance of software that does not. Figure 1 depicts this
basic objective for an MMM running two applications on
a single-OS system. One application always requires high
performance,and the other requires reliability. Both the reli-
able application and the operating system must be executed
in reliable mode for reasons described in Section 3.4.2. An
MMM can also offer differentiated service to different VMs
within a consolidated server under the control of a Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM). An example of such a system is
depicted in Figure 2. In this case, one guest Virtual Machine
(VM) (including the OS and applications) requires reliabil-
ity, while the other guest VM requires performance. Again,
the highest privileged software (in this case the VMM) must
always run in reliable mode, while less privileged software
has the option of running with higher performance.
Additional objectives of an MMM system are 1) to iso-
late reliable applications from any hardware faults affecting
software executing in performance mode, and 2) to perform
mixed-mode operation with only minor changes to the sys-
tem and application software.
We propose two different ways of handling high-
performance mode in an MMM system, MMM-IPC and
MMM-TP. The simpler method, MMM-IPC idles the re-
dundant cores, eliminating veriﬁcation and synchronization
delays, and improving the Instructions per Cycle (IPC) of
each thread by 34-48%.1 When in high-performance mode,
MMM-TP uses all available cores to independently run ad-
ditional software threads of high-performance applications,
improving throughput by 2.5–4 times. In either system, dif-
ferent cores can be in different modes at different times.
2.1 Mixed-Mode Challenges
Althoughtheobjectivesarestraightforward,theimplications
of running different applications in different modes on the
same machine are less so. Two key challenges in particu-
lar make building an MMM more complicated than simply
turning off DMR when high performance is required. First,
the memory and register state of reliable applications must
1By placing idle redundant cores in a low-power sleep state, MMM-IPC
would also likely either reduce the chip’s power consumption, or allow
the remaining cores to use the excess power budget by increasing their
frequency, for example. We do not evaluate these power options in this
paper, however.be isolated from any hardware faults that may occur when
running performance applications. Second, system software
itself must operate in reliable mode, even when performing
operations on behalf of a performance application — a feat
which is greatly complicated by the desire to run additional
software threads of a performance application. A brief dis-
cussion of these two challenges and an overview of the pro-
posed solutions are provided below.
Memory and Register Protection In an MMM, the ﬁrst
key challenge is to prevent high-performance applications
from corrupting the state of reliable applications. In a fault-
free system this protection is achieved through a combi-
nation of now-standard software mechanisms and policies
(e.g., page-based memory protection) and hardware sup-
port (e.g., TLB permission checks). Further protection can
be achieved using additional software mechanisms such as
Overshadow [9]. However, these existing mechanisms make
the assumption that hardware itself is reliable.
If hardware faults do occur, these protection mechanisms
remain sufﬁcient if the processor is always operating in
DMR mode, since the redundant execution ensures that a
hardware fault on one core is detected and corrected before
the application’s state is updated.
The problem arises when we allow the processor to avoid
DMR mode for certain software. In this case, simple faults
in certain hardware structures will go undetected, allowing
malicious, buggy, or even correct software to write to phys-
ical addresses that are not owned by the application. For ex-
ample, a bit ﬂip in the privileged mode bit, checking logic,
or TLB array can result in the successful translation of an
invalid virtual address. If the resulting physical address con-
tains state used by other software components, such as os-
tensibly reliable applications or the system software, these
other components will become corrupted.
The primary line of defense we adopt for an MMM is
the use of a small hardware structure called the Protection
Assistance Buffer (PAB). When a core is operating in high-
performancemode,the PAB redundantlyveriﬁesthepermis-
sion of stores emanating from the core. If a physical address
is presented to the memory system that is not owned by the
high-performance application, an exception can be gener-
ated to notify the system software before corruption occurs.
System Software Protection The second key challenge to
mixed-mode operation is that all privileged software must
execute in reliable mode, even when called from a high-
performance application. The reason is that when perform-
ing a system call, or other service such as paging,the system
software updates its own internal state, which is used when
performing services for both reliable and high-performance
applications. Executing privileged software in reliable mode
prevents the system from crashing due to faults, as well as
protects the integrity of system services performedon behalf
of reliable applications.
This observation has an important implication for the
scheduling of software threads on the physical cores: Every
time a thread of a high-performance application encounters
a system call, page fault, or interrupt, a mode transition is
triggered. Reliable mode must be entered when these events
occur by appropriating another core to use as a redundant
pair. As a result, transitions from performance mode to reli-
ablemodemustbeperformedwithlowoverhead,sincesome
applications enter the operating system every 200k cycles
(Section 5.3). This rapid transition becomes even more chal-
lenging when the redundant cores needed for reliable mode
are currently being used to independentlyexecute additional
software threads of a high-performanceapplication.
To enable a high performance application to utilize all
on-chip cores, while still switching to reliable mode when-
ever the code running on a core enters the system software,
we propose to leverage our multicore virtualization tech-
niques [34]. These techniques allow the chip to decouple the
physical cores from the virtual processors onto which the
system software schedules threads, providing ﬂexibility in
the mapping of computation onto one or more cores.
3. Mixed-Mode Implementation
The previous section outlined the objectives and challenges
of mixed-mode operation. This section presents the im-
plementation details of a mixed-mode multicore (MMM).
First, we mention basic assumptions about the target mul-
ticore and provide an overview of the Reunion DMR pro-
posal we leverage for this work [27,29]. We then focus on
the other aspects mixed-modeimplementation:the proposed
hardware/software interface, the mechanisms for protecting
memory and system state, and the use of virtualization.
3.1 Target Multicore Assumptions
For this work, we assume a 16-core processor, with out-of-
order cores and a 3-level cache hierarchy. Cores are each
providedwith private, write-throughL1 caches and a private
L2 cache. Similar to the IBM Power5 [13] and AMD quad-
core Opteron [11] processors, we use a shared L3 cache (on-
chip, unlike Power5) that maintains exclusion with the pri-
vate L2s. Further details of the target multicore are provided
in the methodology (Section 4).
We assume that reliable mode is implemented via Dual-
ModularRedundancy(DMR),whileperformancemodeuses
only a single core to run each thread of an application. In
either mode, however, designers may still choose to im-
plement numerous circuit or microarchitectural techniques
within each core.
As withotherarchitecture-levelreliabilityproposals(e.g.,
[7,12,14,19,25,27,29,33,38]),we assumethat mostmemory
hierarchy components maintain reliability by implementing
othertechniquessuch as ErrorCorrectingCodes (ECC). The
exception is the private L1 caches, which are not assumed to
be reliable in this work. We believe this assumption is rea-sonable because 1) techniques such as ECC are much more
effective for these regular, repeated structures than they are
for combinational logic within the cores, 2) the additional
delay introduced by techniques like ECC is more easily tol-
erated in the caches (especially L2 and beyond), and 3) al-
though caches have traditionally been more susceptible to
certain hardware faults than logic circuits, Shivakumar, et
al., project per-chip fault rates in logic to increase much
faster, catching and surpassing the per-chip rates for caches
and other SRAM components by 2011 [24].
3.2 Reunion Overview
Reunion [27,29] is a form of “loose lock-stepping,” which
deﬁnes a logical processing pair as two cores that redun-
dantly execute the same instruction stream, and are pre-
sented to the system software as one logical core. The vocal
core, i.e., the master, implements full coherence, and com-
municates with other cores and caches in the system as nor-
mal. The mute core, i.e., the slave, loads data from its own
private cache hierarchy,but does not expose new values out-
side of that hierarchy.
An additional in-order pipeline stage, Check, is added to
each coreafter executionandbeforeretirement.When enter-
ing Check, an instruction computes a ﬁngerprint, or hash of
its results, and sends this ﬁngerprint to the other core. Each
instructionwaits in the Check stage until it receivesthe other
core’s ﬁngerprint for the same instruction. The instruction is
thencommittedtothe architectedstate ofeachcore.A single
ﬁngerprint can capture all outputs, branch targets, and store
addresses and values for multiple instructions.
A mute core is not required to maintain coherence with
the rest of the system. Instead, all requests emanating from
the private cache hierarchy of a mute core do not change
the state of the line in the directory or any other caches.
The cache hierarchy makes a best-effort attempt to provide
the correct value. Should that attempt fail, a ﬁngerprint mis-
match will occur, which will be detected and corrected sim-
ilar to a transient fault.
3.3 Hardware/SoftwareInterface
This workproposesto implementthe reliability mechanisms
in a thin virtual machine layer beneath the ISA. The chip
exposes two new pieces of information to software via the
ISA. First, it exposes that the chip has multiple operating
modes with different levels of reliability. Second, it exposes
the fact that software is responsible for determining the de-
sired mode, and can do so dynamically for each OS-visible
virtual processor (VCPU).
Thebasisofthemixed-modesoftwareinterfaceisasingle
register per VCPU specifying whether reliability is needed
ornot.This 2-bitregisterspeciﬁesoneofthreemodes:1)op-
erate with high reliability, 2) operate with high performance,
or 3) operate with high performance only when executing
non-privileged (user or guest VM) software. This paper ad-
dresses the issues when mixing the ﬁrst and third modes.
When the privileged software is about to context switch
to an application (or guest VM) which requires high per-
formance, it writes this register to indicate the requirements
of the software running on that VCPU. This register is only
writable by privileged software.
We have intentionally not deﬁned the OS/application in-
terface for using this register. Our evaluation assumes that
an individual application runs from start to ﬁnish with ei-
ther high reliability or high performance, possibly speciﬁed
by an administrator. However, some applications may de-
sire a ﬁner granularityof control. To support this usage, new
system calls to change the reliability mode, and system and
compiler support to specify which pages of memory can be
accessed in performance mode, would likely be necessary.
We leave a more detailed investigation for future work.
3.4 Protecting System Integrity
When performingmixed-modereliability, a key challenge is
to protect the integrity of the system while executing in per-
formance (non-DMR) mode. As described in Section 2.1,
hardware faults can potentially allow buggy, malicious, and
evencorrect software operatingin performancemode to cor-
rupt the state of other applications or the system software.
This section describes the mechanisms to prevent such hard-
ware faults from corrupting the integrity of the system or
applications requiring reliability.
3.4.1 Protecting Memory
The TLB maintains sufﬁcient information to prevent any
user application from illegally accessing memory state.
However, a hardware fault in the TLB array, checking logic,
privileged registers, or L1 cache can allow such an access.
To prevent arbitrary software from accessing memory for
which it does not have permission, we propose to duplicate
the TLB protection check outside of the core before allow-
inga corerunningin high-performancemodeto store data to
its L2 cache.2 This check requires system software to iden-
tify pages that are only allowed to be written by reliable
applications through the proposed Protection Assistance Ta-
ble (PAT). Hardware uses this information to perform a re-
dundant check through the proposed Protection Assistance
Buffer (PAB). The PAT and PAB are described below.
An alternate option may be to replicate these structures,
or harden them by making the transistors larger, slower,
and/or liberally applying other circuit-level reliability tech-
niques. The problems with replicating or hardening are 1)
all of these structures are on the critical load path, and ap-
plying these techniques could impact the latency of every
memory access, and 2) every hardware structure that car-
ries or stores an address from the TLBs until the L2 cache
must be fully hardened or replicated, impacting area, perfor-
2For non-malicious code, it is sufﬁcient to only prevent erroneous stores
from illegally writing memory. For security reasons, preventing erroneous
fetches and loads from reading illegal memory addresses may also be
required, but is left for future work.Figure 3. The Structure of the Protection Assistance Buffer (PAB)
mance, and power. Despite these drawbacks, hardening may
be a viable option for a particular design, making existing
memory protection mechanisms sufﬁcient.
Protection Assistance Table The Protection Assistance
Table(PAT)is similartoaninversepagetable:foreachphys-
ical page in the system, a “1” entry indicates that page can
only be accessed by applications executing in reliable mode,
and a “0” entry indicates that page can potentially be ac-
cessed by any software, including high-performance appli-
cations. At one bit per 8KByte page, the PAT thus requires
16MBytes for one TByte of physical memory. The PAT re-
sides in cacheable memory. System software is responsible
for maintaining the PAT. It must set aside physical memory
for the PAT, and update the entries when it updates its page
table (e.g, on a page fault). We leave a detailed study of the
interactions with large page sizes for future work.
Protection Assistance Buffer A hardwarestructure, called
the Protection Assistance Buffer (PAB), acts as a cache of
PAT entries. It is used to redundantly verify a store’s per-
mission after the TLB, but before accessing the rest of the
system. For a core executing in performancemode, the PAB
is accessed either before, or in parallel with, the L2 cache.
When in reliable mode, the PAB is not used. A match in the
PAB (andTLB) meansan access has the properpermissions;
a permission failure in either the PAB or TLB triggers an ex-
ception,whichthesystemsoftwarecaninterpretas it wishes.
Thus, the PAB and TLB provide redundancy for each other.
Figure3showsadiagramofPAB placementandstructure
for one core in the system. This structure is organized much
like a cache,with a physicallytaggedand indexedarraycon-
taining 64 Bytes (one cache-line worth) of PAT entries. The
PAB operates on physical addresses, since the virtual ad-
dress is assumed to no longer be known for a store access-
ing the L2 cache. A 128-entry PAB requires 8.2KBytes, can
map 512MBytes of physical memory (for SPARC address-
ing), and represents a storage overheadof 1.6% comparedto
the private L2 cache.
L1 write-throughscan either examine the PAB in parallel
with their access to the L2 cache, aborting the L2 access
shouldthePAB indicateaninvalidstore,orwaittoaccessthe
L2 cache until the store is validated by the PAB. This serial
lookup incurs additional latency for stores, but can simplify
the L2 controller logic. Experiments in Section 5 evaluate
both parallel and serial lookups.
The PAB is kept coherent during a TLB demap opera-
tion. On a demap, the TLB sends the physical page address
of the demappedpage to the PAB, which invalidates the cor-
responding entry.
3.4.2 Protecting System Software
As described in Section 2.1, software at the highest privi-
lege level is always executed in reliable mode. Privileged
software may be the OS in a single-OS system, or the soft-
ware VMM or hypervisor in a consolidated server system
(see Figures 1 and 2). As a consequence, a core operating
in performance mode cannot execute any privileged instruc-
tions without causing a transition to reliable mode.
For a consolidated server, we treat each guest VM, in-
cluding OS and applications, as a single entity. We thus pro-
tect the VMM and other, reliable guest VMs from faults oc-
curringto a high-performanceVM, by ensuringthat all traps
to the VMM (runningat the highest privilegedlevel)execute
in reliable mode. We assume that we do not need to protect
the OSs running inside individual guest VMs (though our
proposal could be modiﬁed to do so), since a fault in a per-
formance guest VM will not affect the reliable VMs.
3.4.3 Protecting Registers During Mode Transitions
Unprivileged software is not allowed to write most privi-
legedregisters.However,a faultcan cause unprivilegedsoft-
ware to corrupt a privileged register, or erroneously allow
buggy or malicious software to write one of these registers.
State for reliableapplications is always replicated,and faults
are detected before they are committed to architected state.
To protect against such faults that might occur during per-
formance mode, care must be taken during mode transitions
to replicate and verify privileged state. Each core contains a
small hardware state machine to handle the required steps of
these mode transitions.
In MMM-IPC, two types of mode transitions can occur:
1) a pair of cores leaves DMR mode, because of a high-
performance application returning from a system call, for
example, or 2) a pair of cores enters DMR mode when be-
ginning a system call or other privileged operation, for ex-
ample. When leaving DMR, the cores need only store theirprivileged state to the cache hierarchy for later use, using a
reservedportionof the physicaladdress space (i.e., “scratch-
pad space”). EnteringDMR, however,is more involved.The
vocal core (previouslyrunningin performancemode)has all
of the necessary state, but the mute core does not, since exe-
cutionhasprogressedonthevocalcorealone.Thevocalcore
stores all of its state to the cache hierarchy. The mute loads,
from the scratchpad space, its own previously saved (redun-
dant) copy of the privilegedregisters, the vocal’s copy of the
user registers,and ﬁnallythe privilegedregisters ofthe vocal
core, verifying them with its own copy. This ﬁnal check pre-
vents faults from corrupting the vocal core’s privileged state
whenoperatinginperformancemode.Certainregisters,such
as exception conditions, can change during unprivileged ex-
ecution, and should be sanity checked instead.
For MMM-TP, the steps can be slightly different because
thehardwarescheduler(describedinSection3.5)mighthave
scheduled an independent software thread from a different
VCPU onto the mute core while the vocal core was operat-
ing in performance mode. In particular, when leaving DMR
mode, both cores must store all (not just privileged) state to
the scratchpadspace, and the mute coremust ﬂush its caches
of any incoherent data resulting from Reunion’s mute inco-
herence policy.
An interesting issue arises, however, when performing
loads and stores of a VCPU’s state during a mode switch.
These requests, even from a mute core, must be processed
as normal, even though a mute typically does not perform
coherent memory requests. This means that the cache at
a mute core can simultaneously consist of both incoherent
lines brought into the cache via normal incoherent Reunion
operation, and lines (containing VCPU state) which are co-
herent with the system. A bit is added to the state ﬁeld of
the each line indicating whether or not the line is coherent
with the system.3 As a result of mixing coherent and non-
coherent lines, ﬂushing lines when MMM-TP leaves DMR
mode may not be as simple as gang-invalidating the cache.
Instead, cache lines must be inspected one by one to see
if they are dirty and need to be written back, a potentially
costly operation (see Section 5.3).4
3.5 Scheduling and Virtualization
In any MMM, or architecture-level DMR system, the chip
exposes a certain number of virtual processors (VCPUs) to
the operating system (OS), and is then responsible for map-
ping those VCPUs onto the physical cores. In the case of a
standard DMR system, the chip statically (e.g., [12]) or dy-
namically (e.g., [14]) maps one VCPU onto a pair of cores.
The two MMM systems we propose in this paper, MMM-
IPC and MMM-TP, perform this mapping in two different
ways. Like a traditional DMR system, MMM-IPC statically
3A Coherent bit must also be added to each request sent to the L3.
4The number of dirty lines will never exceed the size of the VCPU state,
about 2.3KBytes for SPARC.
maps one VCPU to a pair of cores, and then simply idles the
redundant core when the software running on that core en-
ters performance mode. By eliminating the veriﬁcation and
synchronization latency of DMR, MMM-IPC can improve
the IPC of each VCPU running in performance mode.
MMM-TP, on the other hand, aims to also improve
throughput by scheduling an independent VCPU to run on
the otherwise idle core. To enable this ﬂexibility, while pre-
serving a simple interface to the system software, MMM-TP
employs our previously proposed multicore virtualization
techniques [34]. The reason such multicore virtualization is
useful for MMM-TP is that the number of cores required to
execute each VCPU changes dynamically depending on the
whims of the system software’s scheduler: It can schedule
software requiringreliability on all VCPUs, software requir-
ing performance on all VCPUs, or any combination, which
can rapidly change.
In MMM-TP, a hardware/ﬁrmware layer manages the
mapping of VCPUs to cores similar to, but much simpler
and at a lower level than, a traditional software Virtual Ma-
chine Monitor (VMM). Hardware supported multicore vir-
tualization provides two important services. First, hardware
support for maintaining VCPU state enables low-overhead
migration of a VCPU from one core (or pair of cores) to
another, unbeknownst to the system software. Second, vir-
tualization allows the cores to be overcommitted, such that
more VCPUs are exposed to system software than there are
available pairs of physical cores. When many VCPUs wish
to executein DMR mode,some of them must be paused.But
when manyVCPUs do not require DMR, all of the cores can
be used for independent VCPUs to increase throughput. An
overcommitted mixed-mode system is depicted in Figure 4.
Here,oneVCPU (V2)isexecutingasoftwarethreadsthatre-
quires reliability, and is executing redundantly on cores C2
and C3. V3 is paused since there are no cores available to
execute it. The other VCPUs are all executing threads that
require performance. This technique operates in the same
manner whether the system software is a single OS, or a
software VMM in its own right, performing another layer of
virtualization among its guest VMs. A major advantage of
choosing Reunion as the DMR system for an MMM is that
it allows any core to operate as a vocal or mute for any other
core,signiﬁcantlyeasingtheschedulingchallengesthatarise
from MMM-TP.
4. Experimental Methodology
4.1 Simulation
For the experiments in Section 5, we use Virtutech Sim-
ics [16], an execution driven, full-system simulator which
functionally models a SunFire 6800 server in sufﬁcient de-
tail to boot unmodiﬁed operating systems. We use Simics as
a functional simulator only, and model timing using Simics
MAI with our own cycle-accurateprocessor and memoryhi-
erarchy module.Figure 4. Improving Throughputin a Mixed-Mode Multicore by Overcommitting Cores
We model each core as having an 8-stage pipeline, out-
of-order,2-wide issue, an 128-entryinstructionwindow, and
operatingat 3GHz.Theload/storequeuecontainsentriesfor
32 loads and 32 stores. The pipeline is 9 stages when using
Reunion. The chip consists of 16 cores. Located with each
core is a split 16k, 2-way, write-through I&D caches, and
a uniﬁed 512k, 4-way private L2. We also model an 8MB,
16-way, shared L3 that is exclusive with the L2s, and has a
55-cycle load to use latency. Cores maintain coherence via a
MOSI directory protocol over a point-to-point interconnect
with an average 10 cycle latency. The L2 directory uses
shadow tags, which are co-located with each L3 bank. Main
memory is 350 cycles load-to-use, with 40 GB/sec of off-
chip bandwidth. In order to not overstate the penalty of
DMR, we model a hardware-ﬁlled TLB, like [29].
Adedicatedﬁngerprintnetworkwitha 10-cyclelatencyis
assumed, as was done in the original Reunion proposal [29].
Reunion’s “sync requests” are not implemented through L2
directory protocol modiﬁcations, but rather through direct
messages sent from the vocal to the mute core.
The ﬁrst set of experiments in Section 5.2 assumes a
parallel PAB and L2 access. A PAB latency of two cycles
is used for serial PAB access in the second set. Although the
full software overhead of PAT manipulation is not modeled,
it is expected to be very minimal, since it should only be
necessary only when page mappings change.
To implement virtualization, we evaluate a thin virtual-
machine layer implemented primarily in hardware, similar
to [34]. We do model the overhead of maintaining VCPU
state. This task is performed by storing the running VCPU’s
state in a portion of cacheable physical memory and loading
it later from the same or a different core. The state can
be transparently migrated to other cores using the on-chip
coherence protocol.
Applications We use several workloads for these exper-
iments, all of which are running on Solaris 9. Apache
and Zeus are static web servers driven by the Surge [2]
client. We do not use any think time in the Surge client.
OLTP is a TPC-C-like workloadusing IBM’s DB2 database.
The database is scaled down from TPC-C speciﬁcation to
about 800MB and runs 192 concurrent user threads with
no think time. pgoltp uses the PostgreSQL database ver-
sion 8.1.3 [21] to run TPC-C-like queries from the OSDL
dbt2 test suite [20]. The database is scaled similarly to
OLTP. pgbench runs TPC-B like queries on the Post-
greSQL database [21]. pmake is a parallel compile of Post-
greSQL using GNU make and the Sun Forte Developer 7 C
compiler. We do not include serial phases.
Eachsimulationrunsfor100millioncycles.Duetowork-
load variability, we simulate multiple runs and report aver-
ageresults with95%conﬁdenceintervals.We usecommitted
user instructions as our metric for ’work’ in all experiments.
User commits has been shown to correlate well with other
‘work’ metrics, such as workload transactions [37].
Consolidated Server Experiments Experiments in Sec-
tions 5.2 and 5.3 evaluate a mixed-modeconsolidated server
where one guest VM is running an application that requires
reliability, and a second guest VM is running an application
that required performance (similar to Figure 2).
Each consolidated workload combines two guest VMs
running the applications described above. In each work-
loads, the same application is running in both guests. Each
guest VM is conﬁgured with its own I/O devices and phys-
ical memory space, but VMs dynamically share the proces-
sors and caches. We are assuming the use of a software
VMM, similar to VMWare ESX Server, which virtualizes
I/O, memory, and privileged instructions. Since we do not
have access to a software VMM which supports our simu-
lated SPARC platform, we are unable to model the overhead
of virtualizing memory or I/O. The two guest OSs are allo-
cated enough physical memory so that the VMM does not
need to swap real memory. This methodology for simulat-
ing consolidated servers is similar to that used by in prior
research [17,34].
For evaluating MMM-IPC, two guest VMs are running,
each of which exposes 8 VCPUs to the VMM. The ﬁrst VM
runs redundantly on all 16 cores, and the second runs in per-
formance mode using only 8 cores. Guests are gang sched-
uled using a 1ms (3 million cycle) timeslice. Using a longer
timeslice with this methodology can create performance in-
consistencies due to OS timers and interrupts.
For evaluating MMM-TP, we again model two guest
VMs. The reliability VM runs 8 VCPUs on 16 cores, and the
performance VM runs 16 VCPUs on all 16 cores. To avoidcomparing results using different workload checkpoints, we
implementthe 16 VCPU guest as two co-scheduled8 VCPU
guests running the same application. This methodologypes-
simistically inﬂates the memory requirements of the high-
performanceguest, but optimistically assumes linear scaling
of applications.
Given our SPARC infrastructure, there is also no way of
evaluatingswitchestoandfromthesystemVMM.Thuscon-
solidated server workloads only switch to or from reliable
mode during at the end of each VMs timeslice, however, we
do investigate the overheads of more frequent switching in
Section 5.3.
5. Evaluation
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the throughputand IPC over-
heads of DMR. We then demonstrate the effectiveness, and
examineseveraldesigntrade-offs,ofmixed-modereliability.
We use a mixed-mode consolidated server for this analysis,
but also present results to gauge the beneﬁts and overheads
of mixed-mode operation on a single-OS system.
5.1 Overhead of Dual Redundancy
To determine the performance overheads of DMR, this sec-
tion compares three systems. The ﬁrst, No DMR 2X repre-
sents a non-DMR system using all 16 cores for running in-
dependent OS-visible VCPUs. The second No DMR, rep-
resents a non-DMR system running eight VCPUs on only
eight cores. The other eight cores are idle. The third is our
re-implementation of Reunion [29], which is running the
same eight VCPUs as No DMR, but running them redun-
dantly across all 16 cores.
Figure 5 examines the performance of these three sys-
tems. Data are normalized to the No DMR 2X conﬁguration.
Figure5(a)showstheper-threadIPC impact,andFigure5(b)
shows the overall throughput impact. In Figure 5(a), per-
threadIPCis measuredastheaverageofeachactiveVCPU’s
User IPC, or the number of User instructions committed
divided by the total number of cycles. The No DMR con-
ﬁguration, running only 8 VCPUs, observes 8–15% higher
IPC than the No DMR 2X conﬁguration, since it has ap-
proximately half of the bandwidth and capacity pressure on
the shared cache and network resources. Reunion, however,
sees a 22–48% decrease in the IPC of each VCPU compared
to No DMR 2X. The performance penalty of using Reunion
is 34–53% compared to the 8 VCPU No DMR conﬁgura-
tion.Thereasonforthis overheadarises primarilyfromthree
sources: additional instruction window pressure, L2 cache-
to-cachetransfers, andserializing instructions.Each of these
three is discussed in more detail below.
While this reduction in per-thread IPC is part of the pic-
ture, the impact on throughput created by the need to use
twice as many core to run the same number of threads is
even larger. Figure 5 shows this overall throughput impact,
and the results are dramatic. As expected,throughputlost by
No DMR, when not running VCPUs on all cores, is nearly
half that of No DMR 2X. The throughput for Reunion is ap-
proximatelyone thirdto onequarterthat ofNo DMR 2X,due
not only to half as many VCPUs running,but also to the fact
that each of those VCPUs slows down signiﬁcantly.
Instruction Window Utilization The ﬁrst overhead affect-
ing DMR execution is capacity pressure on the instruction
window and load/store queue (LSQ). In our experiments,
Reunion observes full structures for approximately twice as
many cycles as does the baseline. This pressure arises pri-
marilyfromtwosources:1)therequirementthat instructions
wait in the Check stage before releasing their instruction
window resources, and 2) the use of sequential consistency
(SC), which causes stores to wait in the instruction window
until they are committed to the cache. The original Reunion
proposal used TSO memory consistency [29], which allows
the use of a store buffer, relieving some of this pressure.
Cache-to-Cache Transfers A second part of the overhead
of Reunion results from increases in L2 cache-to-cache
(C2C) transfers. C2C transfers increase by 20–50% for all
benchmarksexceptpmake(pmakehasveryfewC2Ctrans-
fers in the baseline, and thus observes a 220% increase).
Due to our use of an exclusive L3 cache (like the IBM
Power5 [13] and AMD quad-core Opteron [11] processors),
when the vocal core acquires the line ﬁrst from any source,
the mute core’s later request is likely to receive it via a C2C
transfer from the vocal core. These 3-hop transfers incur ad-
ditional latency compared to a 2-hop L3 hit.
Serializing Instructions Finally, OS-intensive workloads
typically encounter frequent Serializing Instructions (SIs)
that cannot execute out of order [29,36]. With Reunion the
impactofthese instructionsis signiﬁcantbecause1)younger
instructions must be committed before an SI executes, but
the Check stage incurs additional delay before commit, and
2) the SI itself must be validated before youngerinstructions
can enter the pipeline, incurring an additional comparison
delay. When using Reunion, SIs stall fetch in our experi-
ments for 15–46% of cycles. We serialize most of the SIs
considered by Wells and Sohi [36], similar to the kinds of
instructions serialized on a Pentium M (though for a very
different ISA). Smolens, et al., consider most of the same
instructions to be serializing [28], and also report a signiﬁ-
cant performance impact of SIs [29]. Also like Smolens, et
al. [29], and the Ideal SPARC from Wells and Sohi [36], we
simulate a hardware-ﬁlled TLB to avoid over-inﬂating the
number of SIs.
Comparison to Prior Work The IPC impact we identify is
in contrast to the published Reunion work [27,29], which
reports a single thread’s IPC loss of 5–10%. The reason for
this discrepancy arises from increased impact in each of the
three sources identiﬁed above. The original Reunion pro-
posal uses a 2-level (inclusive) cache hierarchy,which is not
likely to incur additional C2C misses. They also use a largerApache OLTP pgoltp pmake pgbench Zeus
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Figure 5. DMR Performance Comparison
(256-entry) instruction window and a TSO memory consis-
tency model, reducingthe resource pressure of store latency,
both on the instructionwindow and in the presenceof SIs. In
fact,SmolensreportsthatSCreducestheperformanceofRe-
union by 30% on average [28], likely making this the largest
contributor to the discrepancy. While both target conﬁgura-
tions can potentially represent realistic systems, the reader
should keep in mind that, even with a different conﬁgura-
tion, per-threadIPC is only a small part of the motivationfor
mixed-mode operation. The original Reunion work did not
examine throughput overheads.
5.2 Performance of a Mixed-Mode Multicore
A mixed-mode consolidated server can provide differenti-
ated service to differentVMs, as described in Section 2. Fig-
ure 6(a) demonstrates the per-thread performance of mixed-
mode operation. The striped bars at the bottom represent the
normalized per-thread IPC of the guest VM that requires the
high reliability of DMR. The solid, top bars represent the
guest VM that does not require such high reliability.
In a traditional consolidated server, if one guest VM re-
quired reliability, then all guests would need to run with
DMR to protect the integrity of the reliable VM. The left
set of bars (labeled DMR Base) thus represents the base-
line, where reliable, DMR mode is used for both VMs. The
second set of bars, labeled MMM-IPC, represents the ﬁrst
MMM scheme where unused redundantcores are allowed to
idle. Due to the IPC overhead of DMR execution, the high-
performance guest VM observes 25–85% speedup over the
full DMR conﬁguration. The runtime of the reliable VM is
virtuallyunchanged,thoughpgoltpobservesa 6.5%slow-
down due to the performance application more quickly dis-
placingthereliableapplication’sdatainthesharedL3cache.
Although we do not capture the effect on application’s user-
request latency,this per-threadIPC providesan indicationof
expected improvements.
The third set of bars, labeled MMM-TP, represents the
second MMM system, which can better utilize all avail-
able cores to execute additional VCPUs. In this case, the
per-thread IPC of those VCPUs still increases, though since
more VCPUs are executing and consuming cache resources,
the speedup of the high-performanceVM is 24–67%, some-
what less than that of MMM-IPC.
Per-thread IPC is only part of the picture, however, since
MMM-TP is using those otherwise-idle cores to execute
moreVCPUs. Figure6(b)shows the overallsystem through-
put, similarly normalized to the always-DMR baseline, and
broken into throughput from each guest VM. The through-
put of MMM-IPC is the same as the per-thread IPC speedup
from Figure 6(a), since the same 8 VCPUs are executing
in either mode. However, for scalable applications, such as
these commercial workloads, improvements in throughput
can be signiﬁcant using MMM-TP, where the ﬁrst VM now
independently executes 16 VCPUs. This high-performance
VMobservesspeedupsof2.4–3.6duetothecombinedeffect
of per-VCPU IPC increase, and additional throughput from
more VCPUs. Speedup of this VM over the static MMM
conﬁguration are 1.8–1.9. The throughput of the machine
overall increases by 1.7-2.3X.
Effect of PAB Latency In previous results, we have as-
sumed that the PAB was accessed in parallel with the L2
tags, causing no additional latency for any memory opera-
tions. We have also examined the impact of a 2-cycle PAB
lookup in serial before accessing the L2 cache. Serialized
accesses can possibly reduce the complexity of the cache
controller. Since only store write-throughs are stalled by
this serial lookup, the performance impact arises primar-
ily through increased pressure on the instruction windowApache OLTP pgoltp pmake pgbench Zeus
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and other structures. Detailed results (not shown for brevity)
demonstrate that serial PAB lookups reduce the IPC of the
application in performance mode by 3–10%. Such a small
performance penalty is easily justiﬁed by the approximately
3X throughput gained by the ability to run in performance
mode. The reliable application does not use the PAB, and
therefore its performance does not change.
5.3 Overhead of Mode Switching
In addition to the PAB, mixed-mode operation can in-
cur overhead during mode transitions. For the consolidated
servers in the previous section, these transitions are infre-
quent, and their cost is easily amortized. However, with a
trap-and-emulate software VMM, or if performing mixed-
mode in a single-OS system, mode transitions need to occur
much more frequently: Every time a guest VM attempts to
performa privilegedoperation,or a performanceapplication
enters or exits the operating system (e.g., for a system call),
a modeswitch occurs.To understandtheexpectedoverheads
of mixed-mode operation in such systems, this section ﬁrst
examines the cost of entering and leaving dual-redundancy,
and then examinesthe frequencythat mode switching would
be necessary. We show that the overheads are low enough
that even frequent mode switches can be easily outweighed
by the beneﬁts of mixed-mode operation.
Switching Overhead Table 1 presents the average over-
head (in cycles) for each VCPU to perform a mode switch.
This data is taken from MMM-TP, which has higher aver-
age overhead than MMM-IPC because it must ﬂush the L2
cache.As shownin the table,the overheadofthe Enter DMR
mode switch is approximately 2.2k cycles for all bench-
marks. The overhead includes the cost of context switching
outthestateoftheperformanceVCPU,switchinginthestate
Enter DMR Leave DMR
Apache 2.4k 10.4k
OLTP 2.4k 10.3k
pgoltp 2.3k 10.2k
pmake 2.2k 9.9k
pgbench 2.3k 10.2k
Zeus 2.4k 10.3k
Table 1. Mixed-Mode Switching Overheads (cycles)
User Cycles OS Cycles
Apache 59k 98k
OLTP 218k 52k
pgoltp 210k 35k
pmake 312k 47k
pgbench 554k 126k
Zeus 65k 220k
Table 2. Cycles Before Switching Modes for Single-OS
of the newly scheduled reliable VCPU, and synchronizing
the vocal and mute cores. The overhead of Leave DMR in-
cludes the cost of synchronizing, context switching out the
reliable VCPU, ﬂushing the L2 cache, and contextswitching
in the newly scheduled VCPU running a high-performance
application. This overhead is much larger due to the cost of
ﬂushing the L2 cache, which takes approximately 8k cycles
since we pessimistically assume that only one cache line can
be ﬂushed or written back to the shared L3 per cycle.
Switching Frequency The cost of the mode transitions in
Table 1 is relatively small if these transitions occur infre-
quently, as is the expected case for a mixed-mode consol-
idated server using some hardware virtualization support
(e.g., [31]), or para-virtualized guests (e.g., [3]). However,whenperformingmixed-modeoperationona single-OS sys-
tem, transitions become necessary whenever the user appli-
cations enters the kernel, e.g., for an interruptor system call.
Transitions may also be frequent when using a trap-and-
emulate software VMM.
To examine the impact the switching latencies would
have in a single-OS system, Table 2 presents the average
numberof cycles beforeswitching froma user applicationto
the OS, and from the OS back to the user application. This
data is for each threadof the baseline, non-DMRsystem. All
benchmarks except Apache and Zeus spend at least 200k
cycles in user mode before entering the OS. Including the
time spent in the OS itself (the sum of the two columns),
all benchmarks except Apache make a set of transitions
into and out of the OS only every 245k cycles or more (for
Apache it is approximately 160k cycles).
The cost of switching into and out of DMR mode, from
Table 2 is approximately13k cycles for all benchmarks.The
implication of this data is that switching modes in a single-
OS system would result in an 8% overhead for Apache,
and less than a 5% overhead for the other benchmarks. For
applications similar to SPEC CPU2000 that encounter a
system call and subsequent mode switch less often, this
overhead would be even less.
The bottom line, evenin a single-OS mixed-modesystem
running applications with frequent OS activity, is that the
IPC and throughput beneﬁts of high-performance mode are
expected to far outweigh the overhead of mode transitions.
6. Related Work
Many circuit- and microarchitectural-level techniques for
tolerating various hardware faults have been proposed. Of
primaryinteresttothis workis amultitudeofrecentmicroar-
chitectural DMR proposals,which join togethertwo cores to
reliably execute one VCPU [12,14,19,29,33,38]. Two of
these in particular suggest that DMR can easily be turned
on and off [19,32], however, they do not investigate the is-
sues involved in doing so. There is nothing inherent in any
of these DMR proposals that is incompatible with the mod-
iﬁcations for mixed-mode execution proposed in this paper.
However, as this paper demonstrates, running some applica-
tions in DMR mode and some in high-performance mode is
not as straightforward as it might ﬁrst appear.
Walcott, et al., observe that the continuous use of redun-
dant multithreading (RMT), within a single SMT core, can
lead to signiﬁcant IPC overheads [32]. They report over-
heads of 43% for one benchmark. To combat this overhead,
they propose to toggle RMT on and off for a given applica-
tion to achieve the desired level of vulnerability from faults.
They address how to decide when RMT is and is not neces-
sary, given the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) of
the processor and application, but do not address the other
issues relating to mixed-mode execution.
Overshadow is a software VMM-based memory encryp-
tion technique that can protect application data from a
security-compromised OS [9]. Similar techniques could be
used to provide additional levels of protection among differ-
ent applications, or different guest virtual machines. Over-
shadow may be able to detect certain cases when an applica-
tion’s data is modiﬁed due to hardware faults that may occur
when another application is executing through data integrity
checks. However, it cannot prevent the corruption from oc-
curring in the ﬁrst place.
Conﬁgurable Isolation [1] is a technique to reconﬁgure
around permanent hardware faults while losing the use of
only a small fraction of the available core, cache, and net-
work resources. In addition, they partition physical memory
between different color domains, and use redundant hard-
ware to maintain isolation between partitions.
7. Summary
As the underlying hardware becomes less reliable, system
designers will seek to include higher-level redundancytech-
niques such as Dual-Modular Redundancy (DMR) in their
multicore designs [12,14,19,29,38]. DMR provides excel-
lent coverage from a variety of sources, yet it comes with
high performance overheads.
In this work, we build on the observation that some ap-
plications even today, and likely more in the future, require
the high reliability of DMR. Yet for the foreseeable future,
many applications will still not require such high hardware
reliability, but will instead continue to require high perfor-
mance. To address this diversity in needs, even among ap-
plication simultaneously running on the same machine, we
propose and design a Mixed-Mode Multicore (MMM). An
MMM enables applications that need extra reliability to run
in an extra-reliable mode, while applications that need high
performance can avoid the high cost of that reliable mode.
Though conceptually simple, two key challenges arise in
designing an MMM. First, care must be taken both during
execution, and during a mode switch in order to protect
reliable applications from any faults that may occur to a
high-performance application. The second key challenge is
that the need to protect the integrity of the system software,
even when running a performance application, complicates
the scheduling of software threads to cores.
After addressing these challenges, an MMM system is
shown to improve the throughput of a high-performance
applicationby 2.5–4times comparedto a system that always
operates in reliable mode. An MMM can improve overall
system throughput of a system with one reliable and one
performance application by 1.9-2.1 times.
If reliabilitytrends continueforthe nextdecadeor longer,
multicore processors without DMR will become less and
less reliable, and therefore useful for a smaller fraction of
applications. Eventually, manufacturing experts may choose
to push technology to a point where nearly all softwareneeds to run with DMR. In the meantime, however, Mixed-
Mode Multicore processors can help ease this transition by
letting the user run more applications in DMR mode with
every processor generation, rather than switching all at once
from running no applications in DMR mode to incurring
signiﬁcant performance loss for all applications.
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